Why do authoritarian regimes charge political opponents with nonpolitical crimes when they can levy charges directly related to opponents’ political activism? We argue that doing so disguises political repression and undermines the moral authority of opponents, minimizing backlash and mobilization. To test this argument, we conduct a survey experiment, which shows that disguised repression decreases perceptions of dissidents’ morality, decreases people’s willingness to engage in dissent on behalf of the dissident, and increases support for repression of the dissident. We then assess the external validity of the argument by analyzing millions of Chinese social media posts made before and after a large crackdown of vocal government critics in China in 2013. We find that individuals with larger online followings are more likely to be charged with nonpolitical crimes, and those charged with nonpolitical crimes are less likely to receive public sympathy and support.

China’s total fertility rate declined very little following implementation of the One Child Policy (OCP) in 1979/1980, but then fell sharply, by more than one-third, during the early 1990s. In this paper, we propose that strengthening bureaucratic incentives under the “One Vote Veto” (OVV) policy, which strictly prohibited career promotion for adherence failure, was necessary for more “effective” implementation of the OCP—and for its delayed impact on fertility. We use provincial variation in OVV implementation to estimate event study regression inputs needed to build actual and counterfactual sequential multi-decrement fertility life tables, finding that the policy explains 46% of China’s total fertility rate decline during the 1990s, driving it below replacement level. Use of intrauterine devices (IUDs, the most prevalent form of modern contraception in China) that was “recommended” by party officials increased by 133% under the policy, a relative increase more than four times as large as the increase in “voluntary” use. Overall, our paper suggests that population policy made a larger contribution to low fertility in China than suggested by past research. More generally, our paper highlights the central role of aligning bureaucratic incentives with public policy objectives, even in a centrally-planned economy like China’s.

Policy experiments are crucial for fostering innovation and mitigating risks and can serve as catalysts for transformative changes. This study investigates the governance of policy experiments in China, focusing on how political factors shape their outcomes. It emphasizes the need to consider concurrent trials—related policy trials implemented simultaneously in a locality that can influence outcomes—when selecting comparable cases for analysis. Such consideration is critical, especially when the policy issue spans multiple sectors and the level of difficulty differs across sectors. By comparing five cities engaged in the same three decarbonization pilots between 2010 and 2015, Hangzhou and Xiamen are identified to have had similar initial conditions and goals but achieved divergent outcomes. This research uncovers the critical role of political leadership in achieving varying levels of decarbonization progress and identifies policy coherence with broader local priorities to be the key explanation for continued leadership attention and efforts devoted to decarbonization despite turnover. The study contributes to the literature by addressing the under-studied impact of political factors and concurrent trials, offering a replicable procedure for future research and practical policy applications.

This paper empirically investigates the labor market effects of China’s 2007 VAT reform, which significantly reduced the tax cost of capital investment. Employing city-by-year variation in the reform, we demonstrate that the tax cuts increased the earnings of skilled workers and left the earnings of the unskilled workers unaffected. Moreover, we find limited impacts of the reform on employment for both skill groups. These results suggest that the tax incentives increased the relative demand for skills, thus resulting in a higher income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.

How do state-controlled broadcasters reach foreign publics to engage in public diplomacy in the era of social media? Previous research suggests that features unique to social media, such as the ability to engage in two-way communication with audiences, provide state-controlled broadcasters new opportunities for online public diplomacy. In this paper, we examine what strategies were used by four Chinese state-controlled media outlets on Twitter to reach foreign publics as the Chinese Communist Party worked to expand its public diplomacy and international media outreach efforts. We find that all outlets increased the volume and diversity of content while none engaged in interactive, two-way communication with audiences, and none appeared to artificially inflate their follower count. One outlet, China Global Television Network, made outsized gains in followership, and it differs from the other Chinese outlets in that it was rebranded, it disseminated a relatively lower share of government-mandated narratives pertaining to China, and the tone of its reporting was more negative. These results show that during a period when Chinese state-controlled broadcasters gained followers on Twitter, outlets made limited use of features unique to social media and instead primarily used social media as a broadcast channel.