That’s a huge challenge for China. As the economy becomes more sophisticated, jobs increasingly require skills in math, science, computers, and language. Where are hundreds of millions of workers without those skills going to find decent jobs?
2. How have ordinary people’s views in China about opportunity and getting ahead changed?
For a long time, there was tremendous optimism in China, and for good reason. From the early 1990s through the early 2010s, the economy was growing at roughly 10% a year. Manufacturing and construction were booming, companies needed workers, and wages were rising. People could move from the countryside to the city, find work, and give their children opportunities they never had.
Here’s something interesting about inequality in China. For a long time, the gap between rich and poor was getting wider, but almost everyone was still getting ahead. Research by some of my Stanford colleagues found that between 1988 and 2018, the incomes of the poorest 10% of China’s adults increased fourfold. That’s extraordinary. Of course, people at the very top did much better—their incomes increased something like 30 times over the same period. But even people at the bottom were seeing their lives improve.
I think that helps explain why people tolerated so much inequality. If your own life is improving, you may not worry so much about how much richer someone else is getting. But what happens when that progress slows or stops?
In recent research with Martin Whyte at Harvard, we found a substantial increase in pessimism about future incomes and living standards, especially among people with less education.
Part of the explanation is what’s happened to the labor market. As wages rose, companies increasingly turned to contractors and informal workers to reduce costs. Our research found that informal employment rose from 33% of total employment in 2004 to 56% in 2017. That means fewer benefits, less job security, and more uncertainty.
Today, many less-educated workers are competing for jobs in delivery, ride-hailing, and other informal services. And when more people chase the same jobs, earnings come under pressure.
For decades, people assumed that if they worked hard, their lives would get better. Increasingly, they’re no longer so sure.
3. Are China’s high-tech successes and the struggles of its low-income population separate stories—or two sides of the same economic model?
I would say they’re both. Some of the problems facing low-income workers started long before the current push into high technology. But China’s emphasis on advanced manufacturing has intensified some of those challenges.
Think about what drove China’s growth for the first several decades of reform. China opened up to trade and foreign investment and became the world’s factory. Then came an enormous property boom, supported in part by local governments that depended on land sales for revenue and wanted to meet growth targets.
All of that created tremendous demand for relatively unskilled labor. You didn’t need a college degree to work in a factory or on a construction site. But over time, companies increasingly relied on informal labor, and wages for less-skilled workers began to stagnate.
Now add automation, robotics, and AI.
This past spring, I took a group of Stanford students to visit factories in China. We saw factories producing more than they had five years earlier, but with fewer than 20% as many workers. And nearly everyone on the factory floor had a vocational college or university degree.
We even visited a so-called dark factory. The production floor doesn’t need lights because there aren’t any workers there. Robots and AI do the manufacturing, while a handful of college graduates monitor everything from a control room.
It’s remarkable. China is becoming incredibly good at producing sophisticated goods. But these factories don’t need many workers, and the workers they do need are highly educated.