Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than nonfamily managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers, as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions.

This paper provides first-hand firm-level evidence on Chinese exporters' reaction to RMB exchange rate movements. We find that the RMB price response to exchange rate changes is very small, indicating relatively high exchange rate pass-through into foreign currency denominated prices, while the volume response is moderate and significant. Furthermore, exporters with higher productivity price more to market, though the pass-through is still very high. Other sources of heterogeneity, such as import intensity, distribution costs, income level of the destination countries, and foreign ownership also matter. Moreover, RMB appreciation reduces the probability of entry as well as the probability of continuing in the export market.

We find that the increased supply of college graduates resulting from college enrollment expansion in China increases college premiums for older cohorts and decreases college premiums for younger cohorts. This finding is inconsistent with the canonical model that assumes substitution among workers of different ages. We subsequently build a simple model that considers complementarities among workers of different ages and different skill levels. Our model predicts that the college premium of senior workers increases with the supply of young college graduates when skill is a scarce resource. The model's predictions are supported by empirical tests.

In this paper, we consider the sources and prospects for economic growth in China with a focus on human capital. First, we provide an overview of the role that labor has played in China's economic success. We then describe China's hukou policy, which divides China's labor force into two distinct segments, one composed of rural workers and the other of urban workers. For the rural labor force, we focus on the challenges of raising human capital by both increasing basic educational attainment rates as well as the quality of education. For the urban labor force, we focus on the issues of further expanding enrollment in college education as well as improving the quality of college education. We use a regression model to show the typical relationship between human capital and output in economies around the world and demonstrate how that relationship has evolved since 1980. We show that China has made substantial strides both in the education level of its population and in the way that education is being rewarded in its labor markets. However, as we look ahead, our results imply that China may find it impossible to maintain what appears to be its desired growth rate of 7 percent in the next 20 years; a growth rate of 3 percent over the next two decades seems more plausible. Finally, we present policy recommendations, which are rooted in the belief that China continues to have substantial room to improve the human capital of its labor force.

China is the world's largest user of industrial robots. In 2016, sales of industrial robots in China reached 87,000 units, accounting for around 30 percent of the global market. To put this number in perspective, robot sales in all of Europe and the Americas in 2016 reached 97,300 units (according to data from the International Federation of Robotics). Between 2005 and 2016, the operational stock of industrial robots in China increased at an annual average rate of 38 percent. In this paper, we describe the adoption of robots by China's manufacturers using both aggregate industry-level and firm-level data, and we provide possible explanations from both the supply and demand sides for why robot use has risen so quickly in China. A key contribution of this paper is that we have collected some of the world's first data on firms' robot adoption behaviors with our China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), which contains the first firm-level data that is representative of the entire Chinese manufacturing sector.

Using a recently constructed dataset that draws on the China Employer–Employee Survey, this paper provides new evidence on the earnings gap between rural migrant and urban manufacturing workers in the People's Republic of China. When we only control for province fixed effects, we find that rural migrant workers are paid 22.3% less per month and 32.2% less per hour than urban workers. We find that the gap in hourly earnings is larger than the gap in monthly earnings because rural migrant workers tend to work an average of 5.6% more hours per month than urban workers. Using these data, we also find that 87.4% of the monthly earnings gap and 73.9% of the hourly earnings gap can be attributed to differences in the individual characteristics and human capital levels of rural migrant and urban workers. Furthermore, we find that this unexplained earnings gap varies among different groups of workers. The earnings gap is much larger (i) for workers in state-owned enterprises than in nonstate-owned enterprises, (ii) for college-educated workers than workers with lower levels of educational attainment, and (iii) in Guangdong province than in Hubei province.

Drawing on data from a random sample of manufacturing firms collected in 2016 for the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), we examine differences in measures of productivity and financial returns between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms in China. The summary statistics show that labor productivity and total factor productivity are generally higher at SOEs than at private firms, but the productivity advantage of SOEs can mostly be explained by the higher levels of human capital of their workers, greater market power, and better management. Furthermore, SOEs’ advantage in productivity exists only in industries with higher SOE concentrations. In contrast, measures of financial returns—return on assets and return on equity—are lower for SOEs than for private firms. We believe that these results may reflect the fact that SOEs generally have easier access to capital, human capital, and markets than other types of firms in China.