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Empirical research so far largely suggests that population policies around the world do not explain a majority of the global fertility decline. Notably, even China’s total fertility rate declined little after implementation of the one-child policy in 1979 and 1980, but fertility then fell sharply by more than one-third during the early 1990s. Here we show that strengthening bureaucratic incentives under China’s one vote veto policy, which strictly prohibited career advancement for adherence failure, was instrumental in more effective implementation of the one-child policy, and in its delayed impact on fertility. Using provincial variation in implementation timing, we find that the one vote veto explains nearly half of China’s total fertility rate decline during the 1990s, driving fertility below the replacement rate. Increases in use of intrauterine devices (the most prevalent form of modern contraception in China) that were recommended by local officials were particularly salient. Overall, our findings suggest that population policy, when more strictly enforced due to stronger bureaucratic incentives, made a greater contribution to low fertility in China than suggested by past research.

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Nature
Authors
Lingsheng Meng
Grant Miller
Hongbin Li
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Preprimary education is central to the global education agenda, including Sustainable Development Goal 4.2. Despite global momentum in low- and middle-income countries, cross-national evidence on long-term outcomes associated with preprimary education legislation remains limited. Here we applied a matrix-completion approach with subgroup and sensitivity analyses using 495 nationally representative surveys from 1990 to 2024, covering nearly 6.7 million women across 117 countries. Eligibility under the legislation was associated with higher educational enrolment and completion, and with more gender-egalitarian attitudes, more favourable empowerment-related behaviours and greater reproductive autonomy. For example, eligibility was associated with higher female primary-school enrolment (1.21 percentage points (pp); 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.52 to 1.91; P < 0.001) and completion (0.75 pp; 95% CI 0.24 to 1.25; P = 0.004), greater disapproval of wife-beating (1.04 pp; 95% CI 0.53 to 1.56; P < 0.001), greater participation in decisions about husbands’ earnings (3.25 pp; 95% CI 2.50 to 4.00; P < 0.001) and greater ever use of contraception (2.96 pp; 95% CI 2.33 to 3.59; P < 0.001). Eligibility under the legislation was also associated with lower rates of adolescent childbearing (−2.41 pp; 95% CI −2.67 to −2.14; P < 0.001) and child marriage (−0.43 pp; 95% CI −0.71 to −0.15; P = 0.003). These findings provide cross-national evidence directly relevant to ongoing policy discussions surrounding Sustainable Development Goal 4.2 and broader global development agendas, while emphasizing the importance of implementation capacity and equitable system expansion.

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Nature Human Behaviour
Authors
Scott Rozelle
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Objectives
We examined the effectiveness of a school-based intervention focusing on sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) harms and nutrition-label understanding among children and adolescents.

Study design
We conducted a school-based, two-arm, cluster-randomised controlled trial among upper-primary and lower-secondary students in six Chinese schools. The trial was embedded within the 2022 wave of the Health and Nutrition Panel Survey (HNPS-2022). Classes were the unit of randomisation; within each school and target grade, classes were randomly assigned to a video (<5 min) on SSB harms and nutrition labels or eyesight protection. The trial included a real choice experiment (RCE) and a discrete choice experiment (DCE). Primary outcomes were the probability of selecting a full-sugar fermented milk drink (FMD) at actual beverage selection in the RCE, and the direction and relative importance of preferences for prespecified beverage attributes in the DCE. We used ANCOVA and mixed logit models.

Results
Between September and October 2022, 24 classes were randomly assigned to control (12 classes; 653 students) or intervention (12; 649); 1269 students were analysed (641 control and 628 intervention). At actual beverage selection, 367/641 (57.3%) control participants selected the full-sugar rather than the low-sugar FMD, compared with 228/628 (36.3%) intervention participants (adjusted absolute difference −0.21, 95% CI -0.28 to −0.15; p < 0.0001; adjusted odds ratio 0.39, 95% CI 0.30 to 0.51; p < 0.0001). In the DCE, beverage profile (a combination of beverage type and sugar content) had the highest relative importance (49.6%), followed by price (38.4%). The intervention shifted preferences towards healthier options, especially among primary school students.

Conclusions
A brief health literacy intervention supported healthier immediate beverage choices, but sustained SSB prevention will require clearer, child-friendly sugar information and school policies that make healthier beverage options easier to choose.

Journal Publisher
Social Science & Medicine
Authors
Scott Rozelle
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2027 SCCEI China Conference banner image.

 

The Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institution's (SCCEI) annual China Conference brings together leading voices from policy, industry, and academia to examine key economic trends in China and their implications for the world.

This year's theme and selected speakers will be announced in the coming months. Updates will be posted here as confirmed.

*Schedule is subject to change  

Location: 
Bechtel Conference Center
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford University

*Topics, speakers, and timing will be confirmed soon. 



10:00 AM - 10:25 AM  Registration & Light Breakfast

10:25 AM - 10:30 AM  Welcome & Opening Remarks


10:30 AM - 12:00 PM  Keynote Address


12:00 PM - 1:00 PM  Lunch
 
1:00 PM - 2:00 PM  Session 1 
 

2:00 PM - 2:20 PM  Break
 
2:20 PM - 3:20 PM  Session 2 

 

3:20 PM - 3:40 PM  Break

3:40 PM - 4:40 PM  Session 3

 

4:40 PM - 5:00 PM Closing Remarks & Networking



Questions? Contact scceichinaconference@stanford.edu 

 


Bechtel Conference Center
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford University

This event is by invitation only.

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Background
The Thinking Healthy Extended Program (THEP) is a nonspecialist-delivered mental health intervention targeting female caregivers (mothers and grandmothers) of children aged 6-36 months in rural China. It consists of 24 fortnightly group sessions, supplemented by individual home visits for caregivers who miss group sessions, and integrates cognitive reframing techniques, behavioral engagement, childrearing skills, and peer support. Embedded within a large-scale randomized controlled trial, this study aims to evaluate implementation fidelity of THEP, examine hypothesized mechanisms of change, and identify contextual factors, including enablers and barriers, that influenced intervention implementation.
 

Methods
In-depth interviews were conducted at 3 months and 10 months into the intervention implementation with 50 caregivers and 10 facilitators. The interview guides were developed based on the UK Medical Research Council’s process evaluation framework, with the facilitator interview guide focused on implementation fidelity, the caregiver interview guide focused on mechanisms of change, and contextual factors explored in both guides. All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using thematic analysis.
 

Results
THEP facilitators demonstrated competence in coordinating schedules, delivering sessions, and engaging caregivers. Caregivers reported improvements in peer support and childrearing skills, along with some uptake of behavioral engagement. However, both facilitators and caregivers demonstrated limited understanding of cognitive reframing techniques. Grandmothers (who accounted for 43% of the sample in the current study) experienced greater challenges than mothers with respect to applying the four program mechanisms of change. Several contextual factors, including a child-focused orientation, distractions related to the presence of children at sessions, and intergenerational differences between mother and grandmothers, influenced THEP implementation.
 

Conclusions
THEP was feasible to deliver through nonspecialist facilitators, but implementation quality was constrained by limited understanding of cognitive reframing strategies and variation in caregiver engagement. Future adaptation and scale-up should prioritize facilitator capacity and intervention approaches that are more feasible for nonspecialist providers and more accessible to diverse caregivers.

Journal Publisher
SSM - Mental Health
Authors
Yuyin Xiao
Scott Rozelle
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SCCEI Seminar Series (Winter 2027)


Friday, January 22, 2027 | 12:00 pm -1:20 pm Pacific Time
Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way


About the Speaker 
 

Xiaobo Lü

Xiaobo Lü is the Jack M. Forcey Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His research explores the relationships between fiscal policies, party-building, and state-society relations in authoritarian regimes, particularly in China. He is particularly interested in the formation and functioning of political parties and institutions in authoritarian regimes across both historical and contemporary contexts. He has earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University in 2011.



Questions? Contact Xinmin Zhao at xinminzhao@stanford.edu
 


Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall

Xiaobo Lü, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
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SCCEI Seminar Series (Spring 2027)


Friday, March 12, 2027 | 12:00 pm -1:20 pm Pacific Time
Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall, 616 Jane Stanford Way


About the Speaker 
 

Han Zhang

Han Zhang is a political sociologist and computational social scientist. His research examines how digital surveillance technologies—such as street cameras, facial recognition, and algorithmic systems—strengthen state capacity and alter state–society relations. In particular, he focuses on how government surveillance influences collective action and social movements, bureaucratic behavior, and citizens’ perceptions of state control.

Methodologically, he uses computer vision and text analysis to construct large-scale datasets on surveillance infrastructure and protest events from multimodal sources, including street-view imagery and social media content. He then applies causal inference—using both observational identification strategies and randomized experiments—to analyze these data.



Questions? Contact Xinmin Zhao at xinminzhao@stanford.edu
 


Goldman Room E409, Encina Hall

Han Zhang, Assistant Professor of Sociology and International and Public Affairs, Brown University
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Scott Rozelle
Matthew Boswell
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This is the first installment of a regular Q&A series with leading SCCEI-affiliated scholars about what the evidence tells us about China—and what’s missing from the debates shaping our understanding of the country. In this feature, economist Scott Rozelle explains why China's economic future may hinge on the hundreds of millions left out of its high-tech success story.
 


Scott Rozelle headshot

Scott Rozelle, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Faculty Director of the Rural Education Action Program at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions, has spent decades studying China's rural and low-income populations. Author of Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise, he examines why China's remarkable economic achievements have not translated into better opportunities for everyone, and what that means for the country's future.


 

1. How large is China’s low-income population, who are they, and what does economic life actually look like for them?


I think one of the things people outside China often don’t appreciate is just how many people are still struggling economically. We hear a lot about China’s growing middle class, and rightly so. But in 2020, China’s then-premier Li Keqiang pointed out that some 600 million Chinese had an average monthly income of just 1,000 yuan, or about $140. As Li himself observed, that’s barely enough to rent a room in a medium-sized Chinese city.

Who are these people? Many come from rural China. They tend to have relatively little formal education, and they work in construction, manufacturing, and increasingly, informal services. Ride-hailing drivers are one example. Many work 12-hour days or longer, amid growing competition and pressure on earnings.

The big issue is education across this workforce. One study we published shows only about 30% of China’s workforce had been to high school. Now compare that with countries that successfully moved from middle- to high-income status: on average, 72% of their workers had completed high school when they were still middle-income economies. Even countries that got stuck at middle-income levels averaged 36%. So China is starting with a less-educated workforce than many countries that never made the leap.

The big issue is education across this workforce—only about 30% of China’s workforce had been to high school.
Scott Rozelle

That’s a huge challenge for China. As the economy becomes more sophisticated, jobs increasingly require skills in math, science, computers, and language. Where are hundreds of millions of workers without those skills going to find decent jobs?

2. How have ordinary people’s views in China about opportunity and getting ahead changed?


For a long time, there was tremendous optimism in China, and for good reason. From the early 1990s through the early 2010s, the economy was growing at roughly 10% a year. Manufacturing and construction were booming, companies needed workers, and wages were rising. People could move from the countryside to the city, find work, and give their children opportunities they never had.

Here’s something interesting about inequality in China. For a long time, the gap between rich and poor was getting wider, but almost everyone was still getting ahead. Research by some of my Stanford colleagues found that between 1988 and 2018, the incomes of the poorest 10% of China’s adults increased fourfold. That’s extraordinary. Of course, people at the very top did much better—their incomes increased something like 30 times over the same period. But even people at the bottom were seeing their lives improve.

I think that helps explain why people tolerated so much inequality. If your own life is improving, you may not worry so much about how much richer someone else is getting. But what happens when that progress slows or stops?

In recent research with Martin Whyte at Harvard, we found a substantial increase in pessimism about future incomes and living standards, especially among people with less education.

Part of the explanation is what’s happened to the labor market. As wages rose, companies increasingly turned to contractors and informal workers to reduce costs. Our research found that informal employment rose from 33% of total employment in 2004 to 56% in 2017. That means fewer benefits, less job security, and more uncertainty.

Today, many less-educated workers are competing for jobs in delivery, ride-hailing, and other informal services. And when more people chase the same jobs, earnings come under pressure.

For decades, people assumed that if they worked hard, their lives would get better. Increasingly, they’re no longer so sure.

3. Are China’s high-tech successes and the struggles of its low-income population separate stories—or two sides of the same economic model?


I would say they’re both. Some of the problems facing low-income workers started long before the current push into high technology. But China’s emphasis on advanced manufacturing has intensified some of those challenges.

Think about what drove China’s growth for the first several decades of reform. China opened up to trade and foreign investment and became the world’s factory. Then came an enormous property boom, supported in part by local governments that depended on land sales for revenue and wanted to meet growth targets.

All of that created tremendous demand for relatively unskilled labor. You didn’t need a college degree to work in a factory or on a construction site. But over time, companies increasingly relied on informal labor, and wages for less-skilled workers began to stagnate.

Now add automation, robotics, and AI.

This past spring, I took a group of Stanford students to visit factories in China. We saw factories producing more than they had five years earlier, but with fewer than 20% as many workers. And nearly everyone on the factory floor had a vocational college or university degree.

We even visited a so-called dark factory. The production floor doesn’t need lights because there aren’t any workers there. Robots and AI do the manufacturing, while a handful of college graduates monitor everything from a control room.

It’s remarkable. China is becoming incredibly good at producing sophisticated goods. But these factories don’t need many workers, and the workers they do need are highly educated.

China’s technological success is real. But it doesn’t necessarily translate into better opportunities for the hundreds of millions of people who helped build the old economy.
Scott Rozelle

So China’s technological success is real. But it doesn’t necessarily translate into better opportunities for the hundreds of millions of people who helped build the old economy.

4. As China’s era of property-led growth ends, Beijing is betting on advanced manufacturing, green tech, pharma, and other new industries. Are they creating jobs for workers from the old economy?


The short answer is no—not nearly enough, and certainly not for the workers who need those jobs most.

China’s manufacturing output continues to grow, but manufacturing employment began declining in the mid-2010s. That’s what happens when factories become more automated: you can produce more with fewer people.

But the much bigger shock has come from the collapse of the property sector. For years, construction was an enormous source of employment for workers with relatively little education. Now that sector has contracted dramatically. Official figures indicate that roughly 10 million migrant workers left construction in 2022 and 2023 alone.

So where do these workers go?

You might think they could return to the countryside and start farming again. But nearly 80% of rural workers under 40 have never farmed. They don’t know how, and they have no intention of doing so.

Instead, many are moving into the informal economy—delivering food, driving cars, doing whatever work they can find. As more people enter these sectors, competition increases and earnings come under pressure.

Meanwhile, the new industries China is investing in—electric vehicles, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals—need relatively few workers, and many of those jobs require specialized skills.

The new industries China is investing in—electric vehicles, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals—need relatively few workers, and many of those jobs require specialized skills.
Scott Rozelle

So there’s a huge mismatch. China is investing heavily in the industries of the future, but those industries aren’t creating enough opportunities for workers displaced from the industries of the past.

And that matters enormously. If hundreds of millions of people see their incomes stagnate or decline, that’s going to affect consumption, economic growth, and potentially social stability.

5. Can China sustain its economic success without substantially improving the prospects of “the rest”?


I think this is really the central question.

China has accomplished extraordinary things. It’s a global leader in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and increasingly robotics and AI. Nobody should underestimate those achievements.

But there’s a difference between having world-class industries and becoming a high-income economy.

Look at countries that successfully made that transition—South Korea, Singapore, Ireland, and others. They had relatively well-educated workforces. They weren’t just producing sophisticated goods; they were creating economies in which large shares of the population had the skills to participate in higher-productivity work.

China faces a much harder challenge because hundreds of millions of its workers have relatively little education.

And there’s another issue: China’s government does much less than governments in other countries to redistribute income. One study found that taxes and transfers reduce the income share of China’s richest 10% by only about 4%. In the United States, that reduction is closer to 20%, and in France it’s about 25%.

And redistribution isn't just about fairness. Lower-income households tend to spend a larger share of any additional income they receive, while wealthier households are more likely to save it. That means putting more money in the hands of poorer families could also help China boost household consumption

So could China do more through its tax system, social insurance, and public services, rather than relying so heavily on growth to lift people’s incomes?

If a large share of the population isn’t seeing meaningful income growth, household consumption will remain constrained. That makes it harder to sustain growth through domestic demand. And growing pessimism about the future creates social and political challenges as well.

The World Bank has shown that relatively few countries successfully escape the middle-income trap. Is China headed in that direction? Not inevitably. It has enormous strengths, including its technological capabilities, infrastructure, and manufacturing base.

But I don’t think China can simply innovate its way out of this problem. It also has to improve the education, skills, and economic opportunities of the hundreds of millions of people who aren’t participating in the high-tech boom.

I don’t think China can simply innovate its way out of this problem. It also has to improve the education, skills, and economic opportunities of the hundreds of millions of people who aren’t participating in the high-tech boom.
Scott Rozelle

China’s future won’t be determined just by how successful its best companies become. It will also depend on what happens to the rest of its population.



This article was edited for clarity and brevity with support from ChatGPT. All outputs were reviewed by humans and the final expression was produced by the authors.

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Scott Rozelle explains why China's economic future may hinge on the hundreds of millions left out of its high-tech success story.

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The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) has heightened interest in personalizing computer assisted learning (CAL) programs to tailor their instruction to individual students. Despite the proliferation of AI-driven CAL programs, evidence for their effectiveness remains limited. We present findings from a field experiment in rural China examining whether an AI-driven personalized CAL program improves student achievement. We randomly assign 8647 students from 315 primary school classes to one of three treatment arms: (i) AI-CAL, (ii) non-personalized CAL (active control), and (iii) non-CAL educational activities (pure control). Results indicate that AI-CAL does not significantly improve achievement, with estimates precise enough to rule out non-trivial positive effects. This finding holds across the difficulty of assessment items and across the baseline achievement of students. If anything, AI-CAL might be less effective than non-personalized CAL for students in the middle tercile of baseline achievement. These findings call for caution when scaling AI-driven educational technologies.
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Economics of Education Review
Authors
Tianli Feng
Prashant Loyalka
Scott Rozelle
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Background: 
Early motherhood is a critical yet vulnerable life stage shaped by intersecting individual, familial, societal and structural challenges. Existing research often overlooks the multiple everyday stressors mothers experience across ecological domains. This study explores the lived experiences of mothers in urban China, using an ecological framework to examine the multi-level challenges they face during the first three years after childbirth.

Methods: 
In-depth interviews were conducted with 50 mothers of children aged 0–3 years recruited from nine community and township health centers and one childcare program for a migrant community in Shanghai, China, during well-child visits. Interviews were guided by an ecological framework and analyzed using thematic analysis.

Results: 
Challenges clustered across ecological levels, including postpartum physical health problems, caregiving burden, limited family and social support, work–childcare tension and constrained services, and information and financial constraints. These challenges manifested as common themes that negatively affected maternal wellbeing and the child nurturing environment.

Conclusions: 
These findings highlight that the challenges mothers experience extend beyond the individual level to family and institutional contexts, underscoring the need for coordinated interventions from individual support to family- and system-level services.

Journal Publisher
International Journal for Equity in Health
Authors
Yuyin Xiao
Scott Rozelle
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