Alicia R. Chen, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Stanford University
Research Topic: Roads to (No) Influence: Domestic Incentives and the Distribution of Chinese Aid

Alicia Chen is a PhD candidate in the political science department at Stanford University. Chen’s research focuses on conflict, development, and international economics, with an empirical focus on Chinese development aid. Chen holds an MA in international policy from Stanford University and a BA in political science from the University of Southern California. Prior to doctoral studies, Chen was a Research Specialist at the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) project at Princeton University. 

Q: What advice would you give to someone just starting out in your field of research?
A: I encourage everyone to do fieldwork in the countries they are interested in studying as early as possible. Media coverage (and even data) often doesn’t capture the full picture, and it was immensely helpful to see for myself what the situation is on the ground.

Q: If you could snap your fingers and have one part of your research magically completed, what would it be?
A: Data collection… Many fieldwork trips end up taking much longer than expected because of bureaucratic delays, and there is not much that can be done to speed up the process.

Matthew DeButts, PhD Candidate in Communication, Stanford University
Research Topic: PRC Influence and Chinese Diasporic Media in the Digital Age

Matt DeButts is a PhD candidate in communication, studying Chinese media, censorship, and propaganda. Before coming to Stanford, Matt wrote about Chinese economics and politics for The Economist Intelligence Unit in Beijing, covered culture as a special correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, and edited the foreign affairs newsletter Legation Quarter. At Stanford, he was a 2023-24 Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) fellow, and a graduate research assistant at the Stanford Internet Observatory. His academic work has been published in the Journal of Communication, Social Media+ Society, and EMNLP Findings.

Q: What advice would you give to someone just starting out in your field of research?

Q: How would you describe your research to a fifth grader?
A: My research looks into how powerful people, like governments, try to get people to believe things. Sometimes, governments treat you like a grown-up, explaining things and allowing you to decide for yourself. But other times, they treat you like a kid, always thinking they know what’s best for you. My research looks into how and why they do that.

SCCEI offers grants to support exceptional researchers conducting data-driven research related to China's economy. We accept proposals two times per year, Fall and Winter. Visit the SCCEI Research Grants and Fellowships webpage for more details and current opportunities.

Slowing Growth, Thriving Tech
Despite slowing economic growth, China’s industrial and tech strength remains formidable. Its economy is ~75% the size of the U.S. in dollar terms, but China accounts for 33% of global manufacturing value-added, projected to rise to 49% by 2050. “China is very strong in all sorts of advanced manufacturing... in many cases it is almost entirely a Chinese concern.”

The gap is vast, according to another panelist: in 2023, China had 1,500 commercial ships under construction; the U.S. had three. Non-state firms drive export growth, crowding out for shrinking shares of foreign-led exports (60% to 30%). “There is plenty of profitable activity going on, especially in the non-state sector.”

Meanwhile, Made in China 2025 has paid dividends. “At a first approximation, it looks like a pretty good success,” said one panelist, citing EVs, clean tech, and automation, but admitted that weaknesses persist in sectors like semiconductors and aerospace. Nevertheless, China’s highly competent manufacturers, tech companies, and deep reservoir of human capital ensure that despite costly and inefficient industrial policies, China still has “a good amount of fuel left in the tank.”

Rather than stagnating like Japan in the 1990s, panelists agreed China would more closely resemble a “Leninist Germany”—an authoritarian state with a globally competitive, export-driven, tech-intensive economy.

An Enduring Value Proposition for the World, but Pushback is Growing 
Around the world China is embedding itself in local production ecosystems. Several panelists described how Chinese firms have established smartphone assembly plants in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Indonesia. EV assembly and battery processing plants have followed, particularly in Zimbabwe and the DRC. In practice, countries receiving China’s investment often express more concern about being left behind by the West than overwhelmed by China.

China’s outbound investment is not just commercial; it is also strategic. As one panelist put it, this “industrial diplomacy” steers capital toward geopolitically friendly or economically useful countries—especially those with preferential trade access to the U.S. or E.U., like Mexico and Morocco—and away from places perceived as hostile, such as India.

This strategy has helped China rebuild global supply chains with itself at the center, creating new production ecosystems around batteries, robotics, AI, and advanced manufacturing. As one expert noted, firms like BYD, Xiaomi, and Huawei are at the core of “interlocking industrial ecosystems” that tie together multiple cutting-edge sectors across borders.

Yet pushback is growing. In 2023, 117 of 198 World Trade Organization complaints against China came from low- and middle-income countries. These nations aren’t rejecting Chinese investment, panelists pointed out—they’re renegotiating harder, hedging more, and believing less.

The conference underscored a world in flux—one where China’s industrial and technological dynamism continues to reshape global supply chains even as its assertive statecraft provokes growing resistance. While some panelists warned of the breakdown of integrationist hopes, others saw opportunity in a more defined and stable strategic rivalry, even if it takes the form of a new cold war. A key takeaway was the paradox of China’s global role: it remains an important source of growth and innovation, yet inspires distrust that is prompting nations to pursue more reciprocal, conditional partnerships. In navigating this uncertain era, both China and the West appear to be groping toward a new equilibrium—messy, complex, and decidedly post-unipolar.

Discover more from the 2025 SCCEI China Conference. 
 

Urgent Rethink Needed on U.S-China Trade and Technological Competition
Stein also pushed back against long-held assumptions that the U.S. market alone can dictate global business trends. The notion that “the only market that matters is the U.S. market” no longer holds, noting that Chinese consumers and innovation ecosystems now play a decisive role in shaping product development and global supply chains. He noted that European businesses have expressed a radical shift in strategy, they said, “we've been in China for Asia, in North America, for the Americas…We're now going from that model to what could very well become an, ‘in China for China and the world minus one.’ And the minus one is, of course, the U.S. market.”

On the technology front, he offered a candid evaluation of the U.S.-China competition. Stein reflected on the current state of artificial intelligence in China and the U.S., he said, “ at the end of the day it's not who has the best model; a good enough model is a good enough model, where it really makes a difference is in the application…and I see China racing ahead in the application of AI.” 

Know Your Competitor
Stein concluded with a call for more measured and constructive engagement. He urged both Washington and Beijing to establish clearer rules of the road, maintain open lines of communication, and invest in policy solutions that reduce uncertainty rather than amplify it.

Stein’s keynote offered a business-grounded counterpoint to prevailing narratives of decoupling and confrontation. His insights reinforced the importance of understanding the full complexity of economic interdependence, as well as China’s capacity for global market disruption, and the costs of miscalculation. As part of the broader SCCEI China Conference, his remarks served as a reminder that if America does not properly understand its competitor, efforts to stay ahead may well backfire and erode U.S. strength and global standing. 

A full recording of Sean Stein’s keynote is available on YouTube and below.

China’s Global Ambitions
In response to a question posed by Professor Li, Economy said, “I think, under Xi Jinping, there are big ambitions.” She followed by listing out several of China’s objectives including:

1. Become the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, which begins with China's sovereignty claims around Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea;
2. Continue to have the international business community be dependent on China for parts of its supply chain;
3. Create an insulated domestic economy that is protected from pressures of the global economy but at the same time exerts enormous influence on it;
4. Shape the geostrategic and political landscape in new ways through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative and through its behavior in international institutions;
5. De-dollarize the global economy and increase the role of the Chinese currency.

Economy concluded by sharing that China has “a number of big ambitions, none of which actually coincides with us,” and although there are certainly areas for collaboration between China and the U.S., she’s not sure the current U.S. administration is interested in exploring them.

Economy’s address was a highlight of the SCCEI China Conference, which featured panels and presentations from leading scholars and practitioners on China’s economy, governance, and international strategy. The event reflects SCCEI’s mission to promote policy-relevant research and open dialogue on China’s role in the global economy.

A full recording of Dr. Economy’s talk is available on YouTube and below.