Below is an excerpt from the SIEPR policy brief published online.

"As the United States and China enter a new and contentious phase of their relationship, Stanford scholars are setting and expanding research agendas to analyze China’s economic development and its impact on the world. The newly launched Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions (SCCEI, pronounced “sky”) was formed by the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) to support their work.

The goal of SCCEI and its affiliated faculty is to provide a dispassionate, fact-based architecture that can help policymakers, business leaders and the general public navigate the fraught relationship between the U.S. and China.

This policy brief outlines the scholarship already underway by some of SCCEI’s affiliates. It includes a range of research on the world’s most populous country: education and wage disparities; workforce transformation; emissions trading; China’s one-child policy; and the effect that racism against Chinese students in America has upon their views about authoritarian rule. As the center matures, research agendas will expand and focus on trade, global supply chains, technology, intellectual property rights, worker productivity, and a range of developing issues affecting the connection between Washington, D.C., and Beijing and the rest of the world."

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We estimate the return to attending elite colleges in China using 2010 data on fresh college graduates. We find that the gross return to attending elite colleges is as high as 26.4%, but this figure declines to 10.7% once we control for student ability, major, college location, individual characteristics, and family background. The wage premium is larger for female students and students with better-educated fathers. We also find that the human capital and experiences accumulated in elite colleges can explain almost all the wage premium.

How much of the increase in sex ratio (male to female) at birth since the early 1980s in China is attributed to increased prenatal sex selection? This question is addressed by exploiting the differential introduction of diagnostic ultrasound in the country during the 1980s, which significantly reduced the cost of prenatal sex selection. We find that the improved local access to ultrasound technology has resulted in a substantial increase in sex ratio at birth. Our estimates indicate that roughly 40 to 50 percent of the increase in sex imbalance at birth can be explained by local access to ultrasound examinations.

To examine poverty on China’s campuses, we utilize the Chinese College Students Survey carried out in 2010. With poverty line defined as the college-specific expenditures a student needs to maintain the basic living standard on campus, we find that 22 percent of college students in China are living in poverty. Poverty is more severe among students from the rural or Western parts of the country. The college need-based aid program must be improved because its targeting count error is over 50 percent. Lacking other income sources, poor students rely heavily on loans and working to finance their college education.

Since the introduction of the one-child policy in China in 1979, many more boys than girls have been born, foreshadowing a sizable bride shortage. What do young men unable to find wives do? This paper focuses on criminality, an asocial activity that has seen a marked rise since the mid-1990s. Exploiting province-year level variation, we find an elasticity of crime with respect to the sex ratio of 16- to 25-year-olds of 3.4, suggesting that male sex ratios can account for one-seventh of the rise in crime. We hypothesize that adverse marriage market conditions drive this association.

In the 1990s, rural youth from poor counties in China had limited access to college. After mass college expansion started in 1998, however, it was unclear whether rural youth from poor counties would gain greater access. The aim of this paper is to examine the gap in college and elite college access between rural youth from poor counties and other students after expansion. We estimate the gaps in access by using data on all students who took the college entrance exam in 2003. Our results show that gaps in access remained high even after expansion. Rural youth from poor counties were seven and 11 times less likely to access any college and elite Project 211 colleges than urban youth, respectively. Much larger gaps existed for disadvantaged subgroups (female or ethnic minority) of rural youth from poor counties. We also find that the gaps in college access were mainly driven by rural–urban differences rather than differences between poor and non-poor counties within rural or urban areas.

In 1987, 4 per cent of girls were adopted within China. Why? Unlike infanticide, abandonment rids parents of daughters while preserving the supply of potential brides. In fact, an erstwhile tradition common in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces had parents of sons adopting an infant girl to serve as a future daughter-in-law and household help. Analysing a nationally representative 1992 survey of children, we found that: (1) girl adoptions were concentrated in the above-mentioned provinces; (2) girls were predominantly adopted by families with sons; (3) adopted girls faced substantial disadvantage as measured by school attendance at ages 8–13. In the 1990s, as the sex ratio at birth climbed, were girls aborted rather than abandoned? Observing that in the 2000 census too many girls appear in families with older sons, we estimated that at least 1/25 girls were abandoned in the 1990s, a proportion that in Fujian and Jiangxi may have peaked at 1/10 in 1994.

Using data from China's Urban Household Survey and exploiting China's mandatory retirement policy, we use the regression discontinuity approach to estimate the impact of retirement on household expenditures. Retirement reduces total non-durable expenditures by 20 percent. Among the categories of non-durable expenditures, retirement reduces work-related expenditures and expenditures on food consumed at home but has an insignificant effect on entertainment expenditures. After excluding these three components, retirement does not have an effect on the remaining non-durable expenditures. It suggests that the retirement consumption puzzle might not be a puzzle if a life-cycle model with home production is considered.