Globalization
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Matthew Boswell
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The second annual SCCEI China Conference, held at Stanford University on May 14, brought together leading scholars and policy experts to engage in a lively discussion on the evolving contours of China’s strategic posture in an ever-changing global economy. Amid a shifting geopolitical and economic landscape, panelists examined how structural shocks—ranging from trade fragmentation to military realignments—are forcing a reassessment of long-standing assumptions. The conference offered a candid, multifaceted view of China's global economic position, exploring its technological prowess, industrial diplomacy, and the increasingly complex global responses to its expanding influence.

Groping Towards a New Great Power Equilibrium
The era of a unipolar security order led by the U.S. and a laissez-faire economic regime anchored in globalization is over. Its demise was hastened by three structural shocks: U.S. backlash to trade liberalization, China’s sweeping industrial policies, and its growing military assertiveness. In the U.S., political support for trade collapsed while China’s Made in China 2025 industrial policies brought about “a large shift in the global production map.” China’s security alignment with Russia, and militarization of regional waters, recast its rise as a national security threat. As one panelist put it, “the dominant role China plays in supply chains now has a national security valence.”

Compounding the matter for one panelist is the weakening of U.S. allies. The U.S comprises just 5% of the global population but accounts for 25% of global GDP and 50% of global military spending. Meanwhile Europe’s share of GDP has dropped from 30% to 17%, even as it shoulders nearly 50% of global social spending—much of it underwritten by U.S. security guarantees. U.S. domestic spending has risen unsustainably from $3.7 trillion under George W. Bush to over $7 trillion, requiring a necessary rebalancing, even if it is messy and unpopular.

U.S. expectations that economic integration would liberalize China have proven wrong and misguided assumptions continue to mar relations. One panelist noted that in Beijing “political concerns are more important than economic interests.” In the latest trade war with the Trump administration, China resisted concessions, prioritizing regime legitimacy and national pride. Conceding on trade isn’t just an economic loss—it would be an unacceptable “political surrender to Western capitalism.”

As the U.S. and China grope for a new equilibrium, one panelist concluded, “if we can get to cold war, we’re good. Cold wars are not hot, and they allow for cooperation.” 

In Beijing, political concerns are more important than economic interests.

Slowing Growth, Thriving Tech
Despite slowing economic growth, China’s industrial and tech strength remains formidable. Its economy is ~75% the size of the U.S. in dollar terms, but China accounts for 33% of global manufacturing value-added, projected to rise to 49% by 2050. “China is very strong in all sorts of advanced manufacturing... in many cases it is almost entirely a Chinese concern.”

The gap is vast, according to another panelist: in 2023, China had 1,500 commercial ships under construction; the U.S. had three. Non-state firms drive export growth, crowding out for shrinking shares of foreign-led exports (60% to 30%). “There is plenty of profitable activity going on, especially in the non-state sector.”

Meanwhile, Made in China 2025 has paid dividends. “At a first approximation, it looks like a pretty good success,” said one panelist, citing EVs, clean tech, and automation, but admitted that weaknesses persist in sectors like semiconductors and aerospace. Nevertheless, China’s highly competent manufacturers, tech companies, and deep reservoir of human capital ensure that despite costly and inefficient industrial policies, China still has “a good amount of fuel left in the tank.”

Rather than stagnating like Japan in the 1990s, panelists agreed China would more closely resemble a “Leninist Germany”—an authoritarian state with a globally competitive, export-driven, tech-intensive economy.

China is very strong in all sorts of advanced manufacturing. In many cases it is almost entirely a Chinese concern.

An Enduring Value Proposition for the World, but Pushback is Growing 
Around the world China is embedding itself in local production ecosystems. Several panelists described how Chinese firms have established smartphone assembly plants in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Indonesia. EV assembly and battery processing plants have followed, particularly in Zimbabwe and the DRC. In practice, countries receiving China’s investment often express more concern about being left behind by the West than overwhelmed by China.

China’s outbound investment is not just commercial; it is also strategic. As one panelist put it, this “industrial diplomacy” steers capital toward geopolitically friendly or economically useful countries—especially those with preferential trade access to the U.S. or E.U., like Mexico and Morocco—and away from places perceived as hostile, such as India.

This strategy has helped China rebuild global supply chains with itself at the center, creating new production ecosystems around batteries, robotics, AI, and advanced manufacturing. As one expert noted, firms like BYD, Xiaomi, and Huawei are at the core of “interlocking industrial ecosystems” that tie together multiple cutting-edge sectors across borders.

Yet pushback is growing. In 2023, 117 of 198 World Trade Organization complaints against China came from low- and middle-income countries. These nations aren’t rejecting Chinese investment, panelists pointed out—they’re renegotiating harder, hedging more, and believing less.

The conference underscored a world in flux—one where China’s industrial and technological dynamism continues to reshape global supply chains even as its assertive statecraft provokes growing resistance. While some panelists warned of the breakdown of integrationist hopes, others saw opportunity in a more defined and stable strategic rivalry, even if it takes the form of a new cold war. A key takeaway was the paradox of China’s global role: it remains an important source of growth and innovation, yet inspires distrust that is prompting nations to pursue more reciprocal, conditional partnerships. In navigating this uncertain era, both China and the West appear to be groping toward a new equilibrium—messy, complex, and decidedly post-unipolar.



Discover more from the 2025 SCCEI China Conference. 
 


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The second annual SCCEI China Conference, held at Stanford University on May 14, brought together leading scholars and policy experts. Panelists offered a candid, multifaceted view of China's global economic position, exploring its technological prowess, industrial diplomacy, and the increasingly complex global responses to its expanding influence.

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Senior Research Scholar, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
guoguang_wu_0410a.jpg PhD

Guoguang Wu is a Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University. His research specializes in Chinese politics and comparative political economy, including, in China studies, elite politics, national political institutions and policy making mechanisms, transition from communism, the politics of development, and China’s search for its position in the world, and, in comparative political economy, transition of capitalism with globalization, the birth of capitalism in comparative perspectives, the worldwide rise of the economic state, and the emergence of human security on global agenda.

He is the author of four books, including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism After its Global Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017), editor or coeditor of six English-language volumes, and author or editor of more than a dozen of Chinese-language books. His academic articles have appeared in journals such as Asian Survey, China Information, China Perspectives, China Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Review, Social Research, and Third World Quarterly. He also frequently contributes to The China Leadership Monitor. Some of his works have been translated and published in the languages of French, Japanese, and Korean.

Guoguang received a Ph.D. and a MA in politics from Princeton University (1995; 1993), a MA in journalism/political commentary from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1984), and a BA in journalism from Peking University (1981). During the late 1970s, he was among the sent-down youth in Mao's China, and a textile factory worker following the death of Mao. In the late 1980s, he worked in Beijing as an editorialist and a political commentator in Renmin ribao (The People's Daily) and, concurrently, a policy adviser on political reform and a speechwriter to the Zhao Ziyang leadership. His later appointments include: a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University (1989-1990), a Luce Fellow at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University (1990-91), and an An Wang Post-doctoral Fellow at the John King Fairbank Center of Harvard University (1995-96). Before joining Stanford in 2022, he taught at the University of Victoria in Canada and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Currently he is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for China Analysis of the Asia Society Policy Institute.

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Heather Rahimi
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Jennifer Pan and Hongbin Li during the March 4 SCCEI China Chat lecture.

On March 4, 2022, Professor Jennifer Pan, Associate Professor of Communication and Associate Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University, joined Professor Hongbin Li, co-director of Stanford Center on China's Economy and Senior Fellow at both the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), for a lecture and discussion on her research analyzing information flow between global and Chinese social media. 

Pan opened her talk by reflecting on the fact that “we are living in a world where social media is ubiquitous… sometimes it feels impossible to imagine life before the internet, before social media.” She points out that it is exactly this connectivity that can facilitate transnational conversations like SCCEI’s China Chats. Yet, she also notes that there are restrictions to global connectivity, some of which are imposed by governments, while others stem from users’ adoption of different platforms and products. Pan states that “nowhere is the effort to regulate the transnational flow of digital information more systematic and sustained than in China.” Yet, despite these regulations, “it’s not the case that there is an absolute absence of information flowing into China from the global internet or from U.S.-based social media platforms.” 

It’s not the case that there is an absolute absence of information flowing into China from the global internet or from U.S.-based social media platforms.
Jennifer Pan

In her research, Pan set out to answer that question – exactly how much information from non-Chinese social media platforms flows into Chinese social media? And what types of information flow into Chinese social media from global social media? Who facilitates the flow of information?

To answer these questions, Pan and her team of researchers looked at data from Twitter and Weibo from January to April 2021 at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a combination of deep learning and human annotation, they identified 14 million English-language Twitter posts with content related to COVID-19. Of those tweets, 1.8 million tweets referred to China and COVID-19. Her team then identified the most viral of those tweets and searched for them within the 6.7 million COVID-related Weibo posts.

Pan found that 44% of viral tweets appeared on both Twitter and Weibo, but that the content was co-occurring: it didn’t first appear on Twitter, but appeared on Twitter and Weibo at the same time, going viral independently of one other. In fact, only 13% of viral Tweets first appeared on Twitter and were transmitted to Weibo. Pan then turned to analyzing what type of information was shared on the social media platforms. She noted that although less than 40% of all COVID- and China-related content shared on Twitter was critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and/or racist towards Chinese people, 70% of the content that was shared from Twitter to Weibo was critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and/or racist towards Chinese people. Who was sharing this information? Of the 13% of Weibo posts shared from Twitter, 60% were posted by ordinary (non-VIP) accounts, 30% were posted by individual VIP accounts, and 10% were posted by organizational VIP accounts.

13% of viral Tweets first appeared on Twitter and were then transmitted to Weibo.
Jennifer Pan

After sharing the results, Pan postulated on why the users were sharing the information they were sharing. She noted, "one possibility is that some sort of confirmation bias is going on.” Many people may believe the narrative that the U.S. won’t tolerate the rise of China, so they share information that confirms that belief. She then turned to answer a number of questions from the audience, taking an even deeper dive into her research and the possibilities for future research. 

Watch the full recording:

At the end of the talk, Pan summarized the responses to her motivating questions:

Q: How much information from non-Chinese social media platforms flows into Chinese social media?
A: “There’s very limited flow of information from Twitter to Weibo during the emergence of COVID-19.”

Q: What types of information flow into Chinese social media from global social media?
A: “A really outsized share is content critical of the Chinese government, expressing criticism towards Chinese people and anti-Chinese sentiment.”

Q: Who facilitates the flow of information?
A: The majority of shared posts come from accounts of ordinary users. But at the same time, the users are drawing information for the tweets from posts being shared by traditional media outlets.

Bonus Question: Why are users choosing to primarily share info that is critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and racist toward Chinese people?
A: Although her research can’t answer this question, Pan postulates that it could be due to confirmation bias. Many people may believe the narrative that the U.S. won’t tolerate the rise of China, so they share information that confirms that belief.


SCCEI hosts multiple China Chats with Stanford Faculty events a year, you can view all of our past and upcoming events on our events page and register for the next China Chat!

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Stanford professor Jennifer Pan joined SCCEI for a conversation on her new research looking at information flow from the U.S. to China via social media during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Heather Rahimi Headshot.png MA

Heather Rahimi has worked within both the private and public sector of international education promoting cross-cultural exchange  and supporting students' studies abroad. Her passion for international education was first sparked studying abroad in Buenos Aires, Argentina while completing her B.A. in Spanish and Anthropology from Northern Arizona University. Since then, she has jumped on any opportunity to travel and learn more about different cultures around the world. In addition to travels throughout the Middle East and Europe, she also spent time in Peru on an archaeological dig and a semester in South Korea working in student affairs at the University of Utah Asia Campus. Heather speaks fluent Spanish and holds a Master of Arts in International Education Management from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. 

Communications Manager, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9149 (650) 723-6530
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Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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