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Senior Research Scholar, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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PhD

Guoguang Wu is a Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University. His research specializes in Chinese politics and comparative political economy, including, in China studies, elite politics, national political institutions and policy making mechanisms, transition from communism, the politics of development, and China’s search for its position in the world, and, in comparative political economy, transition of capitalism with globalization, the birth of capitalism in comparative perspectives, the worldwide rise of the economic state, and the emergence of human security on global agenda.

He is the author of four books, including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism After its Global Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017), editor or coeditor of six English-language volumes, and author or editor of more than a dozen of Chinese-language books. His academic articles have appeared in journals such as Asian Survey, China Information, China Perspectives, China Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Review, Social Research, and Third World Quarterly. He also frequently contributes to The China Leadership Monitor. Some of his works have been translated and published in the languages of French, Japanese, and Korean.

Guoguang received a Ph.D. and a MA in politics from Princeton University (1995; 1993), a MA in journalism/political commentary from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1984), and a BA in journalism from Peking University (1981). During the late 1970s, he was among the sent-down youth in Mao's China, and a textile factory worker following the death of Mao. In the late 1980s, he worked in Beijing as an editorialist and a political commentator in Renmin ribao (The People's Daily) and, concurrently, a policy adviser on political reform and a speechwriter to the Zhao Ziyang leadership. His later appointments include: a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University (1989-1990), a Luce Fellow at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University (1990-91), and an An Wang Post-doctoral Fellow at the John King Fairbank Center of Harvard University (1995-96). Before joining Stanford in 2022, he taught at the University of Victoria in Canada and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Currently he is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for China Analysis of the Asia Society Policy Institute.

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Heather Rahimi
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Jennifer Pan and Hongbin Li during the March 4 SCCEI China Chat lecture.

On March 4, 2022, Professor Jennifer Pan, Associate Professor of Communication and Associate Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University, joined Professor Hongbin Li, co-director of Stanford Center on China's Economy and Senior Fellow at both the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), for a lecture and discussion on her research analyzing information flow between global and Chinese social media. 

Pan opened her talk by reflecting on the fact that “we are living in a world where social media is ubiquitous… sometimes it feels impossible to imagine life before the internet, before social media.” She points out that it is exactly this connectivity that can facilitate transnational conversations like SCCEI’s China Chats. Yet, she also notes that there are restrictions to global connectivity, some of which are imposed by governments, while others stem from users’ adoption of different platforms and products. Pan states that “nowhere is the effort to regulate the transnational flow of digital information more systematic and sustained than in China.” Yet, despite these regulations, “it’s not the case that there is an absolute absence of information flowing into China from the global internet or from U.S.-based social media platforms.” 

It’s not the case that there is an absolute absence of information flowing into China from the global internet or from U.S.-based social media platforms.
Jennifer Pan

In her research, Pan set out to answer that question – exactly how much information from non-Chinese social media platforms flows into Chinese social media? And what types of information flow into Chinese social media from global social media? Who facilitates the flow of information?

To answer these questions, Pan and her team of researchers looked at data from Twitter and Weibo from January to April 2021 at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a combination of deep learning and human annotation, they identified 14 million English-language Twitter posts with content related to COVID-19. Of those tweets, 1.8 million tweets referred to China and COVID-19. Her team then identified the most viral of those tweets and searched for them within the 6.7 million COVID-related Weibo posts.

Pan found that 44% of viral tweets appeared on both Twitter and Weibo, but that the content was co-occurring: it didn’t first appear on Twitter, but appeared on Twitter and Weibo at the same time, going viral independently of one other. In fact, only 13% of viral Tweets first appeared on Twitter and were transmitted to Weibo. Pan then turned to analyzing what type of information was shared on the social media platforms. She noted that although less than 40% of all COVID- and China-related content shared on Twitter was critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and/or racist towards Chinese people, 70% of the content that was shared from Twitter to Weibo was critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and/or racist towards Chinese people. Who was sharing this information? Of the 13% of Weibo posts shared from Twitter, 60% were posted by ordinary (non-VIP) accounts, 30% were posted by individual VIP accounts, and 10% were posted by organizational VIP accounts.

13% of viral Tweets first appeared on Twitter and were then transmitted to Weibo.
Jennifer Pan

After sharing the results, Pan postulated on why the users were sharing the information they were sharing. She noted, "one possibility is that some sort of confirmation bias is going on.” Many people may believe the narrative that the U.S. won’t tolerate the rise of China, so they share information that confirms that belief. She then turned to answer a number of questions from the audience, taking an even deeper dive into her research and the possibilities for future research. 

Watch the full recording:

At the end of the talk, Pan summarized the responses to her motivating questions:

Q: How much information from non-Chinese social media platforms flows into Chinese social media?
A: “There’s very limited flow of information from Twitter to Weibo during the emergence of COVID-19.”

Q: What types of information flow into Chinese social media from global social media?
A: “A really outsized share is content critical of the Chinese government, expressing criticism towards Chinese people and anti-Chinese sentiment.”

Q: Who facilitates the flow of information?
A: The majority of shared posts come from accounts of ordinary users. But at the same time, the users are drawing information for the tweets from posts being shared by traditional media outlets.

Bonus Question: Why are users choosing to primarily share info that is critical of the Chinese government, Chinese leadership, and racist toward Chinese people?
A: Although her research can’t answer this question, Pan postulates that it could be due to confirmation bias. Many people may believe the narrative that the U.S. won’t tolerate the rise of China, so they share information that confirms that belief.


SCCEI hosts multiple China Chats with Stanford Faculty events a year, you can view all of our past and upcoming events on our events page and register for the next China Chat!

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Stanford professor Jennifer Pan joined SCCEI for a conversation on her new research looking at information flow from the U.S. to China via social media during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Heather Rahimi has worked within both the private and public sector of international education promoting cross-cultural exchange  and supporting students' studies abroad. Her passion for international education was first sparked studying abroad in Buenos Aires, Argentina while completing her B.A. in Spanish and Anthropology from Northern Arizona University. Since then, she has jumped on any opportunity to travel and learn more about different cultures around the world. In addition to travels throughout the Middle East and Europe, she also spent time in Peru on an archaeological dig and a semester in South Korea working in student affairs at the University of Utah Asia Campus. Heather speaks fluent Spanish and holds a Master of Arts in International Education Management from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. 

Communications Manager, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9149 (650) 723-6530
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Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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PhD

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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