Courts in China have faced obstacles in reviewing government actions and holding governments accountable for misconduct. Since 2014, the CCP has taken steps to strengthen the judiciary, most notably by: a) requiring courts to accept all administrative claims to prevent arbitrary rejections; b) centralizing the budgets of local courts at the provincial level to reduce dependence on local governments; c) relocating litigation venues to limit local interference; d) expanding judicial review to cover a broader range of cases; and e) mandating that government officials attend trials in person to promote legal accountability and awareness. To what extent have these reforms made the judiciary in China more capable of constraining the power of the government? 

The data. The researchers analyzed 1.64 million administrative judicial documents (e.g., adjudications and rulings) from China Judgments Online between 2014 and 2020 to gauge changes in judicial performance across almost all areas of administrative cases. To analyze public perception of local governments, the researchers also analyzed data from the China Family Panel Studies, a nationwide longitudinal social survey, as well as administrative dispute data from the National Bureau of Statistics. 

Not all cases are created equal. To examine the judiciary’s role post-2014 reforms, the researchers categorized administrative judicial cases — i.e., cases that involve citizens or entities suing the government (typically local government agencies) for alleged illegal actions — as either Routine, Hard, or Political. Routine cases involve daily government services like real estate registration and market supervision with minimal government interest. Hard cases stem from expropriation and police penalties (especially detention), both of which pertain to local fiscal revenue and social stability — key concerns for local governments. Political cases involve Party decisions and the political rights of citizens, which are tied to regime legitimacy and often beyond the reach of the courts. The analysis finds differential impacts of judicial reforms across each type of case.

Higher case acceptance and plaintiff win rates for Routine and Hard cases. Between 2014 and 2020, accepted administrative litigation cases increased by 79%, from 140,352 to 251,294, amid a broader litigation surge in which civil cases rose from 5.2 million to 13.3 million. A 65% spike in first-instance administrative cases — new lawsuits against local governments — occurred within a year of the 2014 reforms. Land expropriation cases (a Hard case) increased by 154% to comprise 32.3% of first-instance cases by 2020. 

Categories of administrative cases 

The win rate of plaintiffs in the sample of 237,751 first-instance administrative cases rose from 33.2% to 42.2% between 2014 and 2020. Among these, the win rate in Routine cases increased from 37.8% to 45.1%, while in Hard cases it rose from 25.5% to 38.4%. Among Hard cases, plaintiffs claimed compensation in 24.7% of land expropriation and demolition compensation cases in 2014, but this percentage increased to 41.4% in 2020. In public security cases with the police as the defendant, the win rate rose from 13.7% to 19.8%. In police detention decision cases — perhaps the most severe direct administrative penalty among public security cases — the win rate increased 55% from 9.6% to 14.9%. 

Improved judicial authority and transparency for Routine and Hard cases. To assess judicial quality and transparency post-2014 reforms, the researchers analyzed attendance of government officials at trials (mandated after 2014), ruling length, and legal citations per ruling. By 2020, relevant government officials attended over 50% of trials nationwide, up from 6% in 2014. Judges expanded the reasoning sections of rulings from an average of 620 to 689 Chinese characters, and specific legal citations in rulings (e.g., insufficient evidence, erroneous application of laws, or procedural violations) increased slightly from 1.48 to 1.51. These findings suggest a greater willingness to explain and justify rulings to the public and thereby reinforce government accountability. Meanwhile, the belief of survey respondents in the credibility of their local government officials increased by 13%, from 4.98 in 2014 to 5.65 in 2020 on a scale of 1 to 10. 

Plaintiff win rate, 2014–2020

Political cases remain largely off limits to the courts. In official discourse, courts lack a legal mandate to review the Party’s actions because the Party is not part of the government. This grants the Party immunity from judicial review or monitoring, and, in practice, courts behave with strict adherence to this law. As a result, there are very few cases concerning the Party in the data, most of which concern government decisions issued jointly with the Party. The contradiction between the Party’s increasing involvement in daily activities and the limited number of judgments concerning these activities suggests that many cases suing over these joint decisions were declined to be heard by the courts. 

China’s judges cannot cite the constitution, which stipulates political rights like free speech and assembly, as a basis for judgment. In rare cases involving penalties related to free speech, plaintiffs won just 1.6% of the time — far lower than in other police-related lawsuits. For demonstrations against the central government, the win rate was 4.5%. Overall, courts rarely overturn government decisions in cases concerning political freedoms. 

An empowered judiciary curbs some excesses but still bows to Party authority. The research reveals observable progress made by China’s courts in monitoring local governments, particularly in routine functions, land expropriation, and administrative detention. The elevation of the court’s role in addressing these Routine and Hard cases may reflect the Party’s willingness to curb local wrongdoing and strengthen central control by addressing citizen grievances and monitoring. However, in Political cases, the instinct to preserve authority and stability appears to supersede the need for checks and balances. Courts appear highly cautious in handling politically sensitive cases, apprehensive of overstepping any boundaries that might provoke the Party’s mistrust and consequently undermine the court’s rising institutional standing.