Reuters/The New York Times write about REAP's research on early childhood development. Read the original article here.

According to data from China’s 2010 census, 76 percent of China’s labor force had not attended high school. Even more concerning, according to the same data only 8 percent of working age individuals in rural China (where the majority of the population resides) had ever attended high school. These low levels of educational achievement suggest that China is facing a human capital deficit that could leave workers ill-equipped to compete in China’s developing economy. This situation has been recognized by individuals in government, such as Cai Jianhua, a government official at China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission, who said, "The reality is we need smart people if we're going to be competitive in the 21st century."

"This is the biggest problem that China faces that no one knows about. This is an invisible problem," said Scott Rozelle, co-director of the Rural Education Action Program (REAP) at Stanford University, "China has the lowest levels of human capital (out of all the middle income countries in the world today). China is lower than South Africa, lower than Turkey. We think that's related to when they were babies, they didn't develop well.”

One cause of these low levels of human capital is parental absence during early childhood. In rural China, it is common for parents to live and work in cities full time while their child remains in their home village with a surrogate caregiver (typically the child’s grandmother). Because grandparents generally have less energy, lower levels of education, and are less receptive to adopting new parenting techniques, there is reason to believe that parental migration could negatively affect the cognitive development of young children.

To begin to combat these barriers to human capital development before they emerge, China's National Health and Family Planning Commission is working with Rozelle and his colleagues to establish early childhood development centers in rural China. Researchers with REAP believe that 300,000 centers are needed across China, and that implementing a program of this size requires government leadership. In the 50 pilot centers, children aged six months to three years old are provided with materials and experiences that encourage their cognitive, physical, and social-emotional development. In these centers, children can experience books, play with toys, and interact with other children. Additionally, the centers provide caregivers with knowledge on how to interact with their child in a enriching manner.

Andrew Batson quotes REAP's research on the challenges facing China's college graduates. Read the original article here.

Hongbin Li, Prashant Loyalka, Scott Rozelle, and Binzhen Wu recently published a piece in the Journal of Economic Perspectives particularly worth flagging. It touches on one of the hotter social debates in China over the past few years: whether the massive expansion of college education since 1999 has created an over-supply of graduates, or is just the beginning of the necessary transformation of the education system to meet the needs of a modern economy.

New graduates take a long time to find jobs, and their starting salaries are often of similar levels to manual laborers. But they counter with a combination of theoretical reasons not to be too concerned by these phenomena, and a more involved estimation of the financial returns to education:

In contrast to this common perception of too many college students, we believe that college expansion is a great policy achievement of China. If we assume that the demand for human capital is fixed in the short-run, then given the unprecedented increase in the supply of college graduates since 1999, it is not surprising that the return to college for young college graduates would decline for a time. However, in the long run, human capital investment can lead to investment in physical capital and skill-biased technological changes, which ultimately will increase the productivity of and return to human capital. In addition, regions and cities in developed nations that experience arguably exogenous shocks to the supply of human capital ultimately also experience increases in the productivity of skilled labor due to human capital spillovers. There is no obvious reason to expect that China’s case would be different in this respect.

Moreover, college expansion could well be a result of rising demand for human capital. Our analysis of data from China shows that the return to college education for the labor force as a whole has continued to rise despite the fast expansion of China’s colleges. In particular, the return for those with 5–20 years of work experience has risen from around 34 percent in 2000 to 41 percent in 2009. A possible reason is the rising demand for skilled workers driven by the influx of foreign direct investment and expansion of trade starting from the early 1990s. The high return to college education for experienced workers implies a high lifetime return (the 10-year lifespan return to college education for the year 2000 graduate cohort is as high as 42 percent), which explains why urban students flood into colleges in spite of the seemingly low short-term return.

Li and his co-authors point to some worrying evidence that the quality of higher education in China has in fact suffered as the number of students has massively expanded. They argue for decentralizing and deregulating higher education, so that universities are not mainly trying to meet government-set enrollment quotas but are instead competing to deliver a good educational experience.

A more serious problem than any over-supply of college graduates is likely to be the rather shocking under-provision of high school education for rural students, which the JEP article shows is weighing down the overall education level of China’s workforce.

Bloomberg quotes REAP's research on China's healthcare system. Read the original article here. 

The outlines of China’s demographic challenge are well-known: By 2050 almost 27 percent of the population will be 65 or older, up from around 10 percent in 2015. Less recognized is that the crisis will hit hardest in rural villages.

China’s cities attract a disproportionate share of government health spending, along with the best doctors, so rural residents must put up with care that is expensive but shoddy. The average cost of a hospital visit is 50 percent of the annual income of a city dweller; for rural residents it’s 1.3 times annual income. Meanwhile, a 2014 survey by Stanford’s Rural Education Action Program found that patients at village health clinics received an accurate diagnosis only about one-quarter of the time. Overprescription of drugs is rampant. 

About 60 percent of China’s senior citizens live in rural areas, where poverty is widespread and health care is poor.